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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Tara Ryan appeals from the district court's decision to 
dismiss her diversity action under the doctrine set forth in 
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 96 S. Ct. 1236 (1976), and subsequent 
cases. Because the district court applied Colorado River 
abstention incorrectly, we will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
In 1995, Ryan attended a party at a beach house owned 
by Charles and LouAnn Johnson and rented for the 
summer to the remaining defendants. The exterior, second- 
floor deck of the house suddenly collapsed, injuring at least 
thirty-three persons, including Ryan, who suffered a 
serious spinal injury. To date, seventeen of these persons 
have filed suit. 
 
Ryan filed this diversity action in federal district court, 
alleging that the defendants negligently caused her injuries. 
The remaining sixteen plaintiffs, however, were nondiverse 
from the defendants and filed their suits in the New Jersey 
Superior Court. In that state court action, twenty-two other 
parties have been joined as third-party defendants, 
including contractors, realtors and predecessors in title. 
 
Defendants in the federal action moved the district court 
to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction under Colorado 
River, arguing that the presence of parallel state and federal 
proceedings involving the same issues counseled in favor of 
abstention. The district court, in an unreported opinion, 
agreed and granted the motion, primarily to avoid 
"piecemeal litigation" and because the case was likely to 
involve complex state law issues. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
It is axiomatic that federal courts have a "virtually 
unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given 
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them" by Congress. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S. 
Ct. at 1246. This precept can be traced at least as far back 
as Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821), 
where the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice 
Marshall, stated: 
 
 It is most true that this Court will not take 
jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that 
it must take jurisdiction if it should. . . . We have no 
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which 
is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one 
or the other would be treason to the constitution. 
 
This principle is no less true in cases where, as here, 
there is a parallel litigation in a state court. "The rule is 
well recognized that the pendency of an action in the state 
court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter 
in the Federal court having jurisdiction . . . ." Colorado 
River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S. Ct. at 1246 (quoting McClellan 
v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282, 30 S. Ct. 501, 505 (1910)); 
accord Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534, 13 S. 
Ct. 695, 697-98 (1893); University of Maryland v. Peat 
Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 275-76 (3d Cir. 1991) 
("The general rule regarding simultaneous litigation of 
similar issues in both state and federal courts is that both 
actions may proceed until one has come to judgment, at 
which point that judgment may create a res judicata or 
collateral estoppel effect on the other action.") (citing 
McClellan). 
 
Nevertheless, in Colorado River, the Supreme Court 
recognized that there are certain extremely limited 
circumstances in which a federal court may defer to 
pending state court proceedings based on considerations of 
"wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation 
of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of 
litigation." 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S. Ct. at 1246. It 
emphasized that "[a]bdication of the obligation to decide 
cases can be justified . . . only in the exceptional 
circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to 
the state court would clearly serve an important 
countervailing interest." Id. at 813, 96 S. Ct. at 1244. 
 
The Court then set forth several factors which can 
support this type of abstention, after cautioning that no one 
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factor is determinative and "[o]nly the clearest of 
justifications will warrant dismissal." Id. at 818-19, 96 S. 
Ct. at 1247. Those factors included: (1) whether the state 
court assumed in rem jurisdiction over property; (2) the 
inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of 
avoiding piecemeal litigation; and (4) the order in which 
jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums. Id. at 
818, 96 S. Ct. at 1246-47. The issue before us is whether 
the district court properly applied this narrow exception to 
jurisdiction on the facts of the present case. 
 
A. 
 
A threshold issue that must be decided in any Colorado 
River abstention case is whether the two actions are 
"parallel." If they are not, then the district court lacks the 
power to abstain. This is a legal issue over which we 
exercise plenary review. See Trent v. Dial Medical, Inc., 33 
F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 1994). Generally, cases are parallel 
when they involve the same parties and claims. Id. at 224. 
 
Appellant argues that the state and federal actions are 
not sufficiently parallel to justify Colorado River abstention. 
She avers that the state court defendants have joined the 
architects and builders of the beach house as third-party 
defendants, and that such joinder might not be possible in 
the federal litigation because one of those parties might 
successfully avoid service of process. She also asserts that 
"John Doe" defendants have been joined in state court, 
tolling the statute of limitations, but that this joinder is 
likely to be impossible in federal court because the statute 
of limitations will have run by the time these defendants' 
true identities are discovered. This is far too speculative a 
basis on which to conclude that the two actions are not 
parallel.1 We reject appellant's argument. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note, however, that the state and federal cases, while otherwise 
involving the same facts and issues, have different plaintiffs and the 
federal plaintiff is not joined in the state litigation. There is some 
question whether, in the absence of identical plaintiffs, two cases can be 
deemed parallel for Colorado River purposes. See Alliance of American 
Insurers v. Cuomo, 854 F.2d 591, 603 (2d Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, 
appellant does not argue that abstention was improper on this basis; 
thus, the issue is not before us and we express no opinion on it. 
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B. 
 
1. 
 
Once the state and federal cases are found to be parallel, 
the next inquiry is whether the district court abused its 
discretion when it decided to abstain, an inquiry which is 
conducted under the factors set forth in Colorado River and 
its progeny. See Trent, 33 F.3d at 225. Of course, to the 
extent the district court evaluated a factor based on an 
erroneous view of the law, it necessarily abused its 
discretion and our review becomes plenary. See, e.g., United 
States v. Romualdi, 101 F.3d 971, 973 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
 
In Colorado River, the United States filed suit in federal 
district court against a large group of water users in Water 
Division 7. The government sought a declaratory judgment 
of its water rights in that region. Shortly thereafter, one of 
the federal defendants filed an action in state court, seeking 
to join the United States as a party under the McCarran 
Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, which allows such joinder in 
water rights cases, and asked the federal court to abstain. 
The district court granted the motions. 
 
In upholding the district court's decision to dismiss the 
federal action, the Supreme Court focused its attention on 
what it considered the most important factor on the record 
before it: avoiding piecemeal litigation. The extraordinary 
nature of the McCarran Amendment, which allows the 
United States to be deprived of its right to adjudication in 
a federal forum, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346, was evidence of a 
clear federal policy that the state court systems were the 
preferred means for avoiding the piecemeal adjudication of 
water disputes. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819, 96 S. Ct. 
at 1247.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Regarding the other factors, the Court stated that the fact that no 
proceedings of substance had occurred in the district court counseled in 
favor of abstention, as did the fact that the suit turned on state law 
water rights, and the 300 mile distance between the local and federal 
courts. Id at 821, 96 S. Ct. at 1248. 
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Several years later, the Supreme Court further refined 
the Colorado River doctrine in Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983), a 
case involving concurrent state and federal proceedings 
arising out of a building construction dispute in which a 
hospital sued a contractor in state court and the contractor 
sought enforcement of a contractual arbitration clause 
against the hospital in federal district court. There, the 
Court reiterated the narrowness of the Colorado River 
exception and held that abstention was improper on the 
facts before it. 
 
The Cone Court emphasized that the most important-- 
indeed "paramount"--factor justifying abstention in 
Colorado River was the McCarran Amendment and its 
policy against piecemeal litigation. 460 U.S. at 20, 103 S. 
Ct. at 939. In contrast, the Cone case involved the Federal 
Arbitration Act, which the Court noted expressly requires 
piecemeal adjudication of certain disputes when necessary 
to enforce an agreement to arbitrate. Id. 
 
The Court then set forth another factor relevant to the 
abstention calculus under Colorado River: whether state or 
federal law provided the rule of decision. With respect to 
that issue, the court noted that the Arbitration Act, unlike 
the McCarran Amendment, did not express any strong 
preference for state proceedings that militated in favor of 
abstention. It then stated emphatically that 
 
our task in cases such as this is not to find some 
substantial reason for the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction by the district court; rather, the task is to 
ascertain whether there exist "exceptional" 
circumstances, the "clearest of justifications," that can 
suffice under Colorado River to justify the surrender of 
that jurisdiction. Although in some rare circumstances 
the presence of state-law issues may weigh in favor of 
that surrender, the presence of federal law issues must 
always be a major consideration weighing against 
surrender. 
 
Id. at 25-26, 103 S. Ct. at 942.3  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Finally, the Cone Court set forth afinal consideration: whether the 
state court would adequately protect the rights at issue. Because it was 
questionable whether the Arbitration Act could require a state court to 
issue an order compelling arbitration, the Court found that this factor 
weighed against abstention. Id. at 26-27, 103 S. Ct. at 942-43. 
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We too have had occasion to apply and refine the 
contours of Colorado River abstention. In Western Auto 
Supply Co. v. Anderson, 610 F.2d 1126 (3d Cir. 1979), two 
businesses filed suit against each other in state court. One 
of the companies then filed a federal diversity action 
against an individual defendant as guarantor of the other 
business' debt. The district court dismissed the federal suit, 
but we reversed, holding that none of the factors that 
justified abstention in Colorado River was present. Id. at 
1127. 
 
On the other hand, we upheld the use of Colorado River 
abstention in Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Callison, 844 F.2d 
133 (3d Cir. 1988). There, the holder of a notefiled a 
diversity suit against its maker. Already pending in Texas 
state court was a securities fraud action by the federal 
defendant against the federal plaintiff. Under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77v, the securities case was nonremovable even though it 
arose under federal law. We held that that statute was 
evidence of a strong federal policy against piecemeal 
litigation: 
 
The mandate of § 77v cannot be effectuated if the 
plaintiff in a securities case brought in state court may 
be thwarted in his choice of forum by being forced to 
litigate simultaneously his claims as defenses in federal 
court. 
 
Id. at 137. Thus, it is evident that the "avoidance of 
piecemeal litigation" factor is met, as it was in Callison and 
Colorado River itself, only when there is evidence of a strong 
federal policy that all claims should be tried in the state 
courts. See Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1111, 1118 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(denying abstention, inter alia, because "the PUC has not 
pointed to any Congressional legislation like the McCarran 
Amendment in Colorado River that evinces `a tempering of 
the policy of enforcing the plaintiff 's choice of a federal 
forum in favor of a policy of avoiding duplicative or 
inconvenient litigation.' " (quoting Harris v. Pernsley, 755 
F.2d 338, 345 (3d Cir. 1985) (similar)). 
 
A recent decision of this court, however, has recently 
applied a broader standard to the "avoidance of piecemeal 
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litigation" factor. In Trent, a dialysis patient filed a federal 
class action sounding in negligence against his dialysis 
center and several of its suppliers, which he alleged injured 
him and the other members of the class. Another party had 
already filed a similar action in state court. This person 
successfully intervened in the federal action, after which 
the district court sua sponte abstained under Colorado 
River. We affirmed, focusing on the piecemeal litigation 
factor and the presence of state law issues: 
 
The principal reasons to abstain . . . are to avoid 
piecemeal litigation and to adjudicate state-law issues 
in state court. Here, state rather than federal law is at 
issue, and piecemeal litigation might result if the 
district court presided over Trent while Snead was 
progressing through the state court system. 
 
Id. at 225. 
 
We cannot reconcile Trent with either the caselaw of this 
circuit, or Colorado River and Cone. As we have discussed 
supra, neither we nor the Supreme Court had ever held, 
until our decision in Trent, that the mere possibility of 
piecemeal litigation justifies Colorado River abstention; 
rather, there must be a strongly articulated congressional 
policy against piecemeal litigation in the specific context of 
the case under review. See, e.g., Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 
819, 96 S. Ct. at 1247 ("The clear federal policy evinced by 
[the McCarran Amendment] is the avoidance of piecemeal 
adjudication of water rights in a river system."); Cone, 460 
U.S. at 16, 103 S. Ct. at 937 ("[T]he [McCarran] 
Amendment represents Congress' judgment that the field of 
water rights is one peculiarly appropriate for comprehensive 
treatment in the forums having the greatest expertise and 
experience." (Emphasis added.)) The presence of garden- 
variety state law issues has not, in this circuit, been 
considered sufficient evidence of a congressional policy to 
consolidate multiple lawsuits for unified resolution in the 
state courts. See Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co., 791 F.2d 
at 1118 (requiring congressional legislation); Harris, 775 
F.2d 338 at 345 (same); Western Auto Supply, 610 F.2d at 
1127 (finding none of the Colorado River factors satisfied in 
state law action on debt); see also Burns v. Walter, 931 
F.2d 140, 146 (1st Cir. 1991) (declaring that concern for 
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avoiding piecemeal adjudication is met only where it "gives 
rise to special complications[,]" not in straightforward state 
law negligence case). 
 
Indeed, if the mere possibility of concurrent state-federal 
litigation satisfies Colorado River's "piecemeal adjudication" 
test, the test becomes so broad that it swallows-up the 
century-old principle expressed in University of Maryland, 
Colorado River, McClellan and Sherwood that "the pendency 
of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings 
concerning the same matter in the Federal court having 
jurisdiction . . . ." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S. Ct. 
at 1246. If this were the law, it is difficult to conceive of any 
parallel state litigation that would not satisfy the "piecemeal 
adjudication" factor and militate in favor of Colorado River 
abstention. If that is true, then the "virtually unflagging 
obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction 
given them[ ]" recognized in Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 
817, 96 S. Ct. at 1246, and reiterated in Cone would 
effectively be eviscerated, a result we cannot presume either 
the Supreme Court or this court to have intended. 
 
Under Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1, 
when two decisions of this court conflict, we are bound by 
the earlier decision. United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793, 
803 (3d Cir. 1994); O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 
340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981). It is clear that, under our prior 
caselaw, specifically University of Maryland, Kentucky West 
Virginia Gas Co., Harris and Western Auto Supply, the 
"piecemeal adjudication" factor would not have been 
satisfied by the presence of a state law negligence action. 
Thus, we will not apply Trent's pronouncement on this 
point to decide the issue before us. 
 
Appellees nevertheless argue that this case presents 
special considerations justifying finding the "piecemeal 
adjudication" factor satisfied. Relying on the reasoning of 
the district court, they invite us to hold that the presence 
of a limited fund may constitute a special circumstance 
beyond the mere presence of parallel state-federal litigation. 
Specifically, they point to the limited fund of insurance 
available to satisfy the claims of the dozens of people who 
were injured in the deck collapse. Were both the state and 
federal actions to proceed, appellees argue, the federal 
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plaintiff might obtain a judgment first and collect a 
disproportionate sum, leaving a greatly depleted "pot" for 
the other claimants. Although we are not unmindful of that 
concern, we nevertheless hold that it does not support 
Colorado River abstention. 
 
First of all, limited fund problems are, unfortunately, not 
uncommon in tort litigation. That fact itself makes such 
cases unlikely candidates for abstention under Colorado 
River, given the Supreme Court's admonition that "only 
exceptional circumstances, the clearest of justifications, . . . 
can suffice . . . to justify the surrender of . . . jurisdiction." 
Cone, 460 U.S. at 25-26, 103 S. Ct. at 942 (internal 
quotation marks and emphasis deleted). More importantly, 
it is Congress that granted plaintiffs like Ryan diversity 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and it is evident from 
the cases reviewed supra that only a congressional intent to 
require state-court adjudication, such as the McCarran 
Amendment or 15 U.S.C. § 77v, will be sufficient to divest 
it. Cf. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 
71 F.3d 1086, 1109 (3d Cir. 1995) (Nygaard, J., concurring) 
(noting that state law cannot divest a federal court of the 
jurisdiction conferred on it by Congress), cert. denied, 117 
S. Ct. 64 (1996). When Congress enacts a statute that 
allows the United States to be joined as a defendant in 
state court or that forbids the removal of certain kinds of 
securities cases, it is making a strong statement that these 
cases either belong in state court or that the plaintiff's 
choice of a state forum is a paramount interest. There is 
simply no such evidence of congressional policy here. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred when it 
found that the "avoidance of piecemeal litigation" factor 
supported abstention. We turn next to the other principal 
factor on which the court justified its abstention decision: 
the presence of state law issues. 
 
2. 
 
The district court concluded that the presence of state 
law issues, including the construction of state and local 
building codes, counseled in favor of abstention. We 
disagree. As Cone made clear, while the presence of federal 
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issues militates against abstention, the converse cannot be 
said; abstention cannot be justified merely because a case 
arises entirely under state law. 460 U.S. at 26, 103 S. Ct. 
at 942. On the other hand, the Cone Court did hint that, 
"in some rare circumstances[,]" state law issues could 
weigh in favor of the federal court's surrender of 
jurisdiction, id., and the Second Circuit has found such 
circumstances sufficient in a mass tort case. In Arkwright- 
Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 205 
(2d Cir. 1985), a blackout forced the closing of many 
businesses in Manhattan for several days. Some of those 
businesses recovered under their business interruption 
policies, and the insurers filed subrogation actions in 
federal court against the allegedly negligent city and public 
utility companies. Meanwhile, Gimbel's Department Store 
and several hundred other plaintiffs commenced a state 
court action against the same defendants, seeking to 
recover those sums not covered by insurance. The court 
held that, because the case raised novel issues of state tort 
and construction law, the scales were tipped in favor of 
abstention. Id. at 211.4 
 
Whatever its inherent persuasiveness, Arkwright-Boston 
is distinguishable from this case. Although a few dozen 
people were injured by the deck collapse, this is hardly a 
mass tort situation with hundreds of claims and parties. It 
thus presents a far less compelling argument for abstention 
than was present in Arkwright-Boston. 
 
We are also skeptical of Arkwright-Boston's rationale, at 
least as applied to the straightforward state negligence law 
issues involved here. Although it is possible that some case 
could involve a skein of state law so intricate and unsettled 
that resolution in the state courts might be more 
appropriate, traditional negligence law does notfit that 
description. It is an area, rather, in which federal courts are 
called upon routinely to predict state law. Were we to 
consider the "state law issue" factor to be met in this case, 
it would be applicable in many more instances than the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The court also found the "piecemeal litigation" prong satisfied, on a 
rationale similar to Trent. As we have discussed supra, we cannot follow 
that holding. 
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"rare circumstances" required by the Supreme Court in 
Cone. Instead, it would be met in nearly every diversity case 
in which the law was not entirely settled. Nor do we see any 
principled difference between the interpretation of state law 
generally and the construction of building codes. Those 
laws and regulations are no more inherently complex or 
unsettled than any other state statute or regulation. We 
therefore conclude that the district court erred when it 
concluded that this factor supported abstention. 
 
3. 
 
We think the district court also was incorrect when it 
found that the ability of the state court to protect Ryan's 
rights militated in favor of surrendering jurisdiction. It 
opined: 
 
While plaintiff argues that "there are inherent dangers 
in forcing a non-resident plaintiff from Massachusetts 
to proceed at the local state level," this Court does not 
find such arguments persuasive at this point in 
history. Beyond this general concern that a foreign 
litigant would be disfavored, plaintiff has identified no 
reasons to believe that the state court would be 
inadequate to protect her rights. We therefore conclude 
that this factor supports a stay or dismissal. 
 
Ryan v. Johnson, No. 95-5789 (AET), typescript at 7 (D.N.J. 
June 13, 1996). This reasoning is problematic for two 
reasons. 
 
First, regardless of a district court's personal views on 
the subject, it is the singular role of Congress to amend or 
repeal the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. While this 
issue has generated much controversy and a number of 
legislative proposals to do just that, none has yet been 
enacted. Until such time as that may happen, the federal 
courts have no choice but to apply the statute faithfully 
and in accordance with well-settled law. 
 
Second, the mere fact that the state forum is adequate 
does not counsel in favor of abstention, given the heavy 
presumption the Supreme Court has enunciated in favor of 
exercising federal jurisdiction. Instead, this factor is 
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 normally relevant only when the state forum is inadequate. 
For example, in Cone, the federal plaintiff sought an order 
compelling arbitration. It was questionable whether the 
state court had the power to grant such an order, and the 
Supreme Court weighed this factor against abstention. 460 
U.S. at 26-27, 103 S. Ct. at 942-43. When the state court 
is adequate, however, the factor carries little weight. See 
Bethlehem Contracting Co. v. Lehrer/McGovern, Inc. , 800 
F.2d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 
III. 
 
In conclusion, none of the Colorado River/ Cone factors 
weighs in favor of abstention. Thus, the strong presumption 
in favor of exercising jurisdiction over this case has not 
been overcome.5 We will reverse and remand the cause for 
further proceedings on the merits. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The district court's evaluation of the remaining factors, which did not 
weigh in favor of abstention in any event, is not the subject of serious 
dispute, hence we need not address those factors here. 
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